En medio de una sociedad que nos invita constantemente a la extroversión, cabe preguntarnos si el encuentro con nosotros mismos a través de una actitud “interior” y reflexiva no puede representar un factor clave para detener, en alguna medida, el proceso de deshumanización que descompone a Occidente.

En el presente trabajo, enmarcado dentro de una consideración antropológico-ética de las virtudes sociales, nos proponemos mostrar el desarrollo de Santo Tomás de Aquino en torno al concepto de objeto de una acción, el cual presta a ésta su cualidad moral de ser una virtud o un vicio y la relación existente entre el sentido objetivo del obrar social humano y la ley natural.

Describimos en este texto el modo de abordaje de la enseñanza de la Filosofía en la UNSL desde la articulación con prácticas de docencia, investigación y extensión en torno a la inquietud del filosofar. Distinguimos previamente los encuadres teóricos que sostienen la propuesta y presentamos el dispositivo de enseñanza desde una puesta en obra dinámica de la noción de teoría como “caja de herramientas” (Foucault, Deleuze). Comprendemos esta experiencia de enseñanza como una convocatoria dinámica a filosofar, como una propuesta de (...) comprensión interpretativa de los textos filosóficos y como un desafío trazado desde la ontología histórica de nosotros mismos, de cara a aprender y enseñar filosofía como capacidad de hacer preguntas, como arte del cultivo de sí y como inquietud para filosofar. (shrink)

The mind-body problem arises because of our status as double agents apparently en rapport both with the mental and with the physical. We think, desire, decide, plan, suffer passions, fall into moods, are subject to sensory experiences, ostensibly perceive, intend, reason, make believe, and so on. We also move, have a certain geographical position, a certain height and weight, and we are sometimes hit or cut or burned. In other words, human beings have both minds and bodies. What is the (...) relation between these? Religion often tells us that we are really embodied souls released at death from our bodily prisons. Could this be right? (shrink)

Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of (...) epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes levels of performance norrmativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge that ascends above the animal level. (shrink)

The knowledge account of assertion—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—aspires to identify the norm distinctive of assertion. One main argument given in support of the knowledge account has been the success with which it explains a variety of Moore-paradoxical assertion. But that explanation does not generalize satisfactorily.

What is involved in acquiring a russellian proposition (x, φ) as content of an attitude: what does it take for one to acquire such an attitude de re? How do we gain access to x itself so as to be able to have (x, φ) as content of our thought?

The theory of knowledge has two sides - epistemology and a bridge to join them: that a belief is justified if and only if obtained by appropriate use of an adequate organon - a principle of theoretical epistemology requiring an organon or manual of practical methodology. Such organon justification is internalist. (How could one ever miss one's source for it?) But it leads briskly to skepticism on pain of regress or circularity - or so it is argued in section 1. (...) In section 2 we consider the epistemology embodied in the Socratic elenchus, which provides a new angle on how methodology relates to epistemology and to science and metaphysics. Thus are we made to face once again the organon account of justification: our internalist bridge principle. That account proves in section 3 to be a special case ,of a more general argumentative account of justification, which in turn agrees with intuitions so powerful as to be enshrined already in our dictionaries. Good rhetoric suggests therefore that 'justification' and its cognates be yielded to the argumentative account; in which case justification must likely fall from its status as principal concept of epistemology. Justification is hence unlikely to be all that is required in general for knowledge, nor is it likely to be what is always required in any premises of use to justify anything. That way, apparently, lies regress or circularity. Better to demote justification to the status of one way for a belief to be appropriate or apt for knowledge, while allowing other ways not dependent on already attained justification: perception, perhaps, or introspection, or memory. (shrink)

Truth centered epistemology puts truth at the center in more ways than one. For one thing, it makes truth a main cognitive goal of inquiry. For another, it explains other main epistemic concepts in terms of truth. Knowledge itself, for example, is explained as belief that meets certain other conditions, among them being true. And a belief is said to be rationally or epistemically justified or apt, which it must be in order to be knowledge, only if it derives from (...) a truth-conducive faculty, an intellectual virtue. What defensible theories of truth are open to such truth-centered epistemology? That is our main question. (shrink)

The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief has collapsed under weighty objections. Some of these are well known; but others, though equally weighty and puzzling, have attracted comparatively little attention, and still demand careful study. Only through such study can we approach correct understanding of propositional knowledge.

El propósito de este artículo es ofrecer una reconstrucción de la teoría ética presentada por Calicles en el Gorgias de Platón, con el apoyo de otros textos de la época que contribuyen a explicardicha teoría y a refinarla. El primer paso de esta reconstrucción es mostrar que Calicles ofrece una teoría perspectivista de los juicios morales, de acuerdo a la cual los juicios morales pueden emitirsedesde dos perspectivas radicalmente distintas – la perspectiva contractual, y la natural. El segundo esmostrar que (...) Calicles emplea un peculiar concepto de naturaleza que le permite sostener que ciertosderechos y prerrogativas naturales provenientes de una perspectiva natural, han de imperar por sobrelos que se derivan de la perspectiva contractual. El resultado es una teoría que además de tener un altovalor filosófico, parece no ser vulnerable a varias de las dificultades fundamentales señaladas por las interpretaciones dominantes, ni estar tampoco afecta al implausible hedonismo burdo que Platón leatribuye a Calicles en el diálogo. (shrink)

1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the question answered. 10. Conclusion.

Este artículo aborda el papel que juega la “admiración” en la traducción heideggeriana de tres pasajes de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. Con base en el volumen 62 de la Gesamtausgabe, se muestra que la “admiración” se relaciona con tres temas fundamentales, a saber: el mundo, la vida y la comprensión. En primer lugar, analizo el tema del mundo compartido y del mundo circundante. En segundo lugar, describo el tema de la vida, la cual es interpretada como “premura insoslayable” y “clara (...) permanencia tranquila”. En tercer lugar, desarrollo el tema de la comprensión en tres fases: “epistémica”, “propia” y “visible”. Estos temas serán retomados en trabajos ulteriores como Ser y tiempo. Por tal motivo, las lecciones de 1922 son valiosas para conocer el itinerario filosófico de Heidegger en los años veinte. Finalmente, se intenta mostrar que la triple traducción del vocablo griego θαυμάζειν realizada por Heidegger, obedece a un criterio específico de interpretación fenomenológica acorde a los temas mencionados. (shrink)

How might one explain the reliability of one's a priori beliefs? What if anything is implied about the ontology of a certain realm of knowledge by the possibility of explaining one's reliability about that realm? Very little, or so it is argued here.

El presente texto pretende analizar el concepto de 'destino' atribuido a Heráclito por ciertos autores de la antigüedad a la luz de los fragmentos del corpus heraclíteo y la doxografía disponibles. Se pretende mostrar la pertinencia de leer a los filósofos presocráticos, como Heráclito de Éfeso, en un contexto enriquecido por fragmentos y material textual de otras clases (doxografía, reminiscencias y paráfrasis) a fin de ofrecer una explicación para la atribución del término ειμαρμεν-eta o su correspondiente en latín 'fatum', al (...) filósofo Efesio. (shrink)

Quattrocki and Friston (2014) argued that abnormalities in interoception—the process of representing one’s internal physiological states—could lie at the heart of autism, because of the critical role interoception plays in the ontogeny of social-affective processes. This proposal drew criticism from proponents of the alexithymia hypothesis, who argue that social-affective and underlying interoceptive impairments are not a feature of autism per se, but of alexithymia (a condition characterized by difficulties describing and identifying one’s own emotions), which commonly co-occurs with autism. Despite (...) the importance of this debate for our understanding of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and of the role of interoceptive impairments in psychopathology, more generally, direct empirical evidence is scarce and inconsistent. Experiment 1 examined in a sample of 137 neurotypical (NT) individuals the association among autistic traits, alexithymia, and interoceptive accuracy (IA) on a standard heartbeat-tracking measure of IA. In Experiment 2, IA was assessed in 46 adults with ASD (27 of whom had clinically significant alexithymia) and 48 NT adults. Experiment 1 confirmed strong associations between autistic traits and alexithymia, but yielded no evidence to suggest that either was associated with interoceptive difficulties. Similarly, Experiment 2 provided no evidence for interoceptive impairments in autistic adults, irrespective of any co-occurring alexithymia. Bayesian analyses consistently supported the null hypothesis. The observations pose a significant challenge to notions that interoceptive impairments constitute a core feature of either ASD or alexithymia, at least as far as the direct perception of interoceptive signals is concerned. (shrink)

We reviewed the output of research and innovation cooperation between Russia and the US, including publications and patents, in the four prospective areas of energy efficiency and renewable energy during 2007-2011. Joint US-Russia research groups appear to focus primarily on hydrogen energy (fuel cells), followed by solar photovoltaics. The upcoming areas of smart grid and biofuels were left out entirely both from research and innovation collaboration. Russian patents in green energy technologies registered in the US are very low in comparison (...) to those from Japan, Korea, and China. (shrink)

El artículo trata de aplicar las concepciones gramscianas al estudio de la primera constitución española. En el análisis se observan cuestiones relacionadas con la educación y los grupos hegemónicos intentando aportar nuevos datos tras la interpretación.

Statistics circulate with ambivalence in governance settings and mass publics—both extolled as authoritative knowledge and the object of distrustful scrutiny. In the field of human rights activism, where the means to create authoritative knowledge operates asymmetrically between activists, organizations, and state actors, this makes statistical production and circulation subject to an intense politics of knowledge. LGBTI human rights actors in Brazil, for instance, constantly produce numbers that endeavor to make homophobia and transphobia epistemically and affectively real to various audiences. From (...) community surveys of personal experiences of violence or discrimination, to civil society reports of homicides, to federal government reports from human rights hotline complaints, LGBTI activists are awash in figures where they find themselves the producers, consumers, and subject material of such data. This article documents how activists and civil servants count violence, constructing homophobia and transphobia as knowable objects. These counting practices emerge from activists’ counterpublic circulations of knowledge about objects as well as epistemic infrastructures (police, journalistic coverage, hotlines) through which LGBTI peoples’ experience becomes refracted. Aware of these complications, activists deploy epistemic doubt and affective certainty to the field of statistics—utilizing the knowledge they offer while questioning whether violence can be measured at all. (shrink)

1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the question answered. 10. Conclusion.

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es estudiar la inducción analítica como método científico de investigación, es decir, como modo válido de hacer ciencia. En 1934, su creador, el filósofo y sociólogo Florian Znaniecki, afirmó que este era el método que debía ser adoptado en toda investigación sociológica. Su relevancia radica en que se propone encontrar explicaciones globales de los fenómenos sociales a partir de la utilización de técnicas cualitativas de investigación. Aquí adopto una perspectiva histórica que permite inscribir su (...) emergencia y evolución en un contexto mayor del desarrollo de metodologías cualitativas en sociología, para luego reflexionar sobre sus presupuestos epistemológicos y las críticas de las que fue objeto. Por último, realizo un balance de los aportes de esta metodología a la disciplina.: The aim of this article is to study analytic induction as a scientific research method, that is, as a valid way of making science. In 1934, the philosopher and sociologist Florian Znaniecki, its creator, referred to this methodology as the method that should be adopted by any sociological research. Its relevance lies on the fact that its goal is to find global explanations to social phenomena by using qualitative research techniques. I adopt a historical perspective to inscribe this method’s emergency and evolution in a larger context of the development of qualitative methods in sociology, and then reflect upon its epistemological basis and the criticisms made in relation to it. Finally, I evaluate this method’s contributions to the discipline. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the notions of mediational fields and dynamic situated senses as a way to identify the structure of experiences, thoughts and their relations. To reach this purpose I draw some lessons from the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the structure of experience, from Cussins’s conception of mediational contents, and from Evans’s account of singular senses. I notice firstly that McDowell’s answer to Dreyfus consists in developing a practical and demonstrative notion of the (...) products of our conceptual capacities. A conception that entails that human experience is not entirely characterised in terms of an abstract specification of truth-conditions. McDowell and Cussins endorse Evans’s conception of singular senses. A specification that takes into account the dynamic and situated abilities involved in making reference. Whereas the first argues in favour of a conceptual conception of experience, the second one argues in favour of a nonconceptual conception. I introduce the notions of mediational fields and dynamic situated senses to argue that both converge in conceiving the contents of experience as mediational and not reducible to an abstract specification of truth-conditions. My proposal is to define a bidimensional space orthogonal to the conceptual/ nonconceptual, experience/thought, know-how/know-that dichotomies. Cognitive contents are ways to disclose the world both as mediational fields and as referential structures. The degree in which those elements are presented determine different varieties of cognition. I use the previous notions to develop the sketch of an account of singular, objective and contextual ways of cognition, and to argue that it is better to begin an enquiry about cognition with notions that do not presuppose a distinction between practical and intellectual capacities. (shrink)